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Summary. We have learned that the speed and quality of innovation can be substan-
tially raised by granting innovators temporary monopolies, such as patents or copyrights, 
which enable them to profit by charging high mark-ups. But such temporary monopoli-
es promote innovation at the expense of diffusion. In other words, the better we inno-
vate, or incentivize innovation, the more we pay a price in terms of the diffusion of 
those same innovations. Rewarding innovation in the wrong way in the areas of phar-
maceuticals, food production, and environmental innovation has especially serious 
effects on the poor. The current system does poorly with regard to access targeting and 
cost-effectiveness. The Health Impact Fund proposes a new way of paying for pharma-
ceutical innovation by incentivizing the development and delivery of new drugs through 
pay-for-performance mechanisms. Furthermore, the same idea could be applied to 
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Rules governing the development and 
distribution of new medicines 
Human progress has two interlinked components. One is in-
novation—the creation, invention and discovery of new 
knowledge—and the other is diffusion—the dissemination or 
uptake of knowledge. Insofar as either of these two compo-
nents is stifled, humanity’s progress is impeded.
We have learned that the speed and quality of innovation 
can be substantially raised by granting innovators temporary 
monopolies, such as patents or copyrights, which enable 
them to profit by charging high mark-ups. But such tempo-
rary monopolies facilitate innovation at the expense of diffu-
sion. In other words, the better we innovate, or promote in-
novation, the more we pay a price in terms of the diffusion of 
those same innovations. 
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Nowhere is this situation more serious than in the area of 
medicines or pharmaceuticals. At present, pharmaceutical in-
novation is rewarded through product patents (vs. process) of 
minimally 20-year duration. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO), since its founding in the mid-1990s—and under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement—has required all of the WTO mem-
ber states to introduce these 20-years patent. Just to give an 
idea of what a difference the institutionalization of these pa-
tents makes, before TRIPS came into effect, India, for example, 
had 7-year process patents. This allowed pharmaceutical inno-
vators to protect a particular process of producing a drug but 
they could not protect the molecule as such. And so generic 
companies were able to invent around the patent, and make 
inexpensive copies of these patented drugs for the benefit of 
patients in India and across the world. 
Disadvantages of the current system: It does 
poorly in regard to access. Universal access is seri-
ously undermined, even in affluent countries, during the time 
the product is under patent by large mark-ups. The profit ma-
ximizing monopoly price tends to be 50 times or even 100 ti-
mes higher than the cost of production. The cost of producing 
pharmaceuticals is low once their production has been esta-
blished, because additional units are inexpensive. However, 
they are sold at very high prices because innovators want to 
take full advantage of their temporary monopoly. And once 
the patent period has expired, there are inadequate incentives 
for the competent provision of generics to patients who are 
poor or hard-to-reach.
Given the high inequalities in income around the world, 
the profit maximizing price for pharmaceutical innovators will 
be high. For them, it makes more sense to sell at prices so that 
only the top 15 % of the human population can buy the pro-
duct. It is not worth lowering the price down to the level whe-
re more people can buy it, because innovators lose more mo-
ney on the smaller mark-up than they gain by selling more 
product to those willing and able to buy at lower prices. 
It does poorly in regard to targeting. Focused inno-
vation is distorted by huge economic inequalities, which steer 
innovators away from diseases predominantly affecting the 
poor and also excessively reward the development of new 
“me-too” and maintenance drugs (me-too drugs are drugs 
with a structure very similar to already known drugs, but with 
minor differences). Pharmaceutical innovators can make the 
most money by producing drugs against diseases that affect 
the rich, affluent or well-insured people; they cannot make 
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Paul Farmer Harvard Medical School; co-founder, Partners in Health
Robert Gallo Institute of Human Virology
David Haslam  Chair, UK National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence
Paul Martin Former Prime Minister of Canada
Christopher Murray Director, University of Washington Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
Baroness Onora O’Neill House of Lords; former British Academy President & Newnham College Principal 
Sir Gustav Nossal Former Director, Hall Institute of Medical Research, University of Melbourne 
James Orbinski Former International President, Médecins Sans Frontières
Sir Michael Rawlins Former Chair, UK National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence
Karin Roth Member of the German Parliament
Amartya Sen Nobel Prize in Economics; Professor, Harvard University
Peter Singer Professor, Princeton University
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much money from diseases that are concentrated among the 
world’s poorest populations. And for that reason, research and 
development of new medicines focuses away from large and 
important diseases that affect the poor, such as malaria, tuber-
culosis, schistosomiasis, and leishmaniasis.
It does poorly in regard to cost-effectiveness. The 
current system is very wasteful—a majority of the money that 
the world spends on pharmaceuticals, about one trillion USD 
every year, does not go back into the manufacture or the rese-
arch and development of new drugs. Most of the money actua-
lly goes to lobbying and gaming, patenting and litigating, waste-
ful marketing and counterfeiting, as well as to huge deadweight 
losses, all of which greatly diminishing overall efficiency. 
The Health Impact Fund (HIF)
The solution on which we work involves the creation of the He-
alth Impact Fund (HIF) [www.healthimpactfund.org]. The HIF is a 
complement to the existing TRIPS which would offer to innova-
tors the opportunity to voluntarily register any new medicine for 
participation in the ‘health impact awards.’ These awards would 
be paid annually out of fixed reward pools that the HIF would 
establish, in the order of 6 billion USD per year. These annual 
pools would be divided up among the registered products in pro-
portion to the health impact—in quality-adjusted life-years, 
which is a measure of disease burden—that each of them have. 
In other words, for all of these registered drugs, the HIF would 
measure the health gains that they produce in the world, and 
would then divide the reward pool accordingly. 
The idea is to establish a second track on which innova-
tors can be rewarded. Pharmaceutical innovators will be able 
to choose which market to enter: they will be free to stay in 
the existing system and get rewarded through the high mark-
ups they can charge, protected by a patent; or they can give 
up that reward opportunity, agree to sell their product at cost 
and then be rewarded on the basis of the health gains. Obvi-
ously, different products will choose different tracks. A pro-
duct that is mainly directed at rich people, such as a hair-loss 
product with little health gain, would stay on the patent-
track, whereas a product that addresses a need of poor peo-
ple, such as a malaria drug, would surely choose the HIF-
track, be rewarded according to health impact and sold 
everywhere at a low price determined by cost. 
Savings from lower drug prices would help governments 
fund the HIF at initially 6 USD billion annually (0.01% of GDP 
of the world). Registrants would be free to keep intellectual 
property rights, but would be required to sell the new medi-
cine at the lowest feasible average cost of manufacture and 
distribution and to grant cost-free licenses after the reward 
period. This price ceiling would generally be determined by a 
tender, where alternative manufacturers could offer to pro-
duce the drug and the lowest costly manufacturer would be 
chosen to deliver the drug to the innovator and the innovator 
would then sell it to wholesalers and retailers.
A distinguished advisory board of Nobel Prize winners 
and politicians (Table 1) has helped the HIF gain political trac-
tion of the idea and also to develop its details further. 
Advantages of the HIF
The HIF can solve the three big problems of the status quo. 
First, it prevents high prices. All HIF-registered drugs are avai-
lable at their real cost or even below cost from day one. Poor 
people can gain access to important new medicines either 
through their own funds or through governments, NGOs, or 
international agencies. In some cases, innovators would have 
incentives to sell the product even below cost. For example 
when, by serving additional patients, the health gains for 
which they would be rewarded would be larger than the ex-
penses of selling below cost.
The HIF also ends the neglect of the diseases of poverty. 
The HIF adds powerful targeting incentives to develop new 
drugs with the greatest health impact—regardless of the so-
cioeconomic composition of patient population. In regard to 
the diseases of the poor, research companies in the develo-
ping world would not be at a disadvantage as they are with 
regard to diseases like cancer and diabetes. In fact, they 
would be at peak competitiveness: there is no head-start by 
“Big Pharma”, there is an availability of patients to run clinical 
trials, as well as a highly committed work force, and a suppor-
tive political and social environment. 
In addition, the HIF boosts cost-effectiveness. It would re-
duce costs and losses due to patenting because innovators 
would not need to patent their drugs in many jurisdictions 
because nobody would dare to compete with them if they 
offered their products at very low prices. There would be 
much less litigation and much less need for competitive 
marketing. In addition, there would be no incentives for co-
unterfeiting because the real drugs would be available at 
very low prices. Gaming and lobbying would also be much 
reduced as would be the enormous deadweight losses that 
are now costing an additional 220 billion USD per year in lost 
sales that would be profitable to the innovator.
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As a bonus, also for rich populations, the HIF would focus 
the attention of innovators on the health of patients, because 
only if you actually promote the health of patients, do you 
make money. Under the present system, innovators have 
every incentive to sell medicines at very high prices regard-
less of whether those medicines promote people’s health or 
not. By combining substantial rewards with low product pri-
ces, the HIF encourages efforts toward: (a) efficacy, making 
sure that the medicine is in good condition with regard to 
freshness, transportation, and storage; b) targeting of pati-
ents who can benefit the most; (c) affordability, price below 
the ceiling to boost reach; (d) careful prescription with pro-
per instructions; and (e) promotion of high compliance and 
adherence, for optimal effect. All these incentives are welco-
me to patients regardless of economic position.
Financing the HIF
The HIF would be funded through governments that are willing 
to participate in the scheme. Each of them would contribute a 
sum around 0.03 % of their gross national income (GNI). The 
investment could be done through long-maturity or perpetual 
bonds with interest pegged to inflation or GNI per capita. Al-
ternatively, the HIF could be funded through a dedicated inter-
national tax, for instance a tax on financial transactions or a tax 
on pollution, whose future revenue stream could be securiti-
zed. Such taxes would also moderate speculative excesses in 
financial markets or slow climate change. 
Ultimately, the idea is to create a diversified endowment, 
managed to generate a stable income stream that would co-
ver a substantial and growing portion of the annual reward 
pools. The endowment could accept contributions also from 
international and non-governmental organizations, foundati-
ons, corporations, individuals and states—following the 
example of private universities. And would thereby give us an 
opportunity personally to contribute to the long-term impro-
vement of human health.
During 2013, the team developing the HIF proposal 
recei ved €2 million from the European Union, which will help 
establish the baseline against which health gains will be mea-
sured. The HIF team also received substantial support from 
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, part of Johnson & Johnson (J&J) 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development, involving their 
new drug against multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis—and the 
first anti-tuberculosis drug developed in over forty years—
Sirturo® (Bedaquiline). Because J&J will contribute the drug 
at zero cost, this pilot will only refine the measurement of 
health gains and of the preservation of the drug’s efficacy. 
The drug was approved by the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion in December 2012, and by the Drugs Controller General 
of India in January 2015, and the pilot in Mumbai is under 
way. 
The HIF would benefit all parties and stakeholders. Inno-
vators would reap moral and reputational gains, large new 
markets, and new R&D opportunities. Patients would achieve 
a broader arsenal of medical interventions, available at more 
affordable prices, and with a strong focus promoting health-
care, rather than merely selling to patients. It would also be-
nefit governments and tax payers by directly improving the 
efficiency of healthcare and reducing the human and econo-
mic burdens of disease. By relying more on pharmaceuticals 
we then need to rely less on hospitals or on intensive care 
units, and we would have less disease in the population. That 
would mean less economic costs involved with disease. Fina-
lly, it would also strengthen North-South partnerships for an 
important global public good. 
Agricultural innovation
The same idea that can potentially work really well in phar-
maceuticals could be applied in other fields, such as food 
production, which faces the same dilemma between innova-
tion and access. Over human history, we have learned that 
stimulating innovation in food production has allowed, with 
given inputs, to produce ever-better nutrition, ever more effi-
ciency at greater nutrient-yield per acre, less use of pestici-
des and fertilizers, etc. To keep hunger at bay, such a progress 
must continue.
But progress in food production has been incentivized in 
the wrong way. In agriculture, too, we encourage the innova-
tion we need through patents, temporary monopolies that 
allow innovators to charge licensing fees or sell products at 
very high prices. And again, this of course hampers the diffu-
sion of higher-yielding crops among the poor, aggravating the 
ravishes of malnutrition. It also prevents the diffusion of in-
novations that would reduce the use of pesticides, fertilizers, 
methane and antibiotics.
An analogous solution
The solution for food production is analogous to the solution 
in the case of pharmaceuticals. Agricultural innovators should 
have at least the option to agree to the cost-free use of their 
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innovation in exchange for payments from public funds that 
would be based on the measured total impact of their inno-
vation in terms of nutrients produced with given inputs, on 
methane emissions averted, and on reduction in the use of 
pesticides, fertilizers, and antibiotics. 
So, as a society, we should define a way of measuring the 
social value of innovations and should then reward each in-
novation according to the social value it produces, which is 
proportional to the number of users and to the benefit to the 
average user. In other words, we would turn these incentives 
on their head. Rather than give innovators an incentive to 
charge high prices, they would be given an incentive to make 
sure that their innovation was very widely used, even by 
poor populations. 
Environmental innovation
The same could work in terms of environmental innovation. 
Here too, innovation is of great importance to protect the 
environment because it allows the production of electricity 
and other goods at much lower cost to the environment. 
However, many green technologies—such as efficient solar 
panels or hybrid cars—are patented, and because of high li-
censing fees, they do not diffuse among poorer populations. 
Once again, we are wrongly rewarding innovation in a social 
issue by giving innovators the right to charge high prices, by 
granting them a temporary monopoly. This is senseless, be-
cause the income from non-diffusion green technologies is 
small, and the harm from the diffusion of preventable excess 
pollution created by the use of old, obsolete technologies is 
large and shared by all. We all have to breathe the foul air 
and we all have to contend with polluted water and a degra-
ding natural environment, including affluent populations and 
their progeny. 
 Again, green innovators should be given at least the opti-
on to agree to the cost-free use of their innovations, in exc-
hange for payments from public funds based on the measu-
red total environmental impact of their innovations, assessed 
according to a pre-announced metric. 
A final thought
Rewarding innovation in the wrong way in the areas of phar-
maceuticals, food production, and environmental innovation 
has especially serious effects on the poor. Poor fall ill more 
often and more severely, they die earlier, they suffer hunger 
and malnutrition, and they also suffer more from the effects 
of climate change, as could be seen in the Philippines with 
Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. And so, incentivizing innovation in 
these social areas in the wrong way perpetuates poverty. 
Poverty, in turn is a key driver of human population 
growth. Currently the total fertility rate (TFR)—the average 
number of children per women—is 4.53 for the 50 least de-
veloped countries versus 1.66 for the more developed regi-
ons, and 2.41 for the remaining middle-income countries. 
Already, 95 of the richer countries around the world have 
reached TFRs below 2.00, and thus will stop growing (except 
through immigration). So, despite the vastly higher mortality, 
poor countries have a rapid population growth, while the 
better-off have little or none. In countries that have eradica-
Table 2. Comparison of total fertility rates in countries that have eradicated poverty (a) and those who have not (b)
Year Botswanaa Colombiaa Singaporea Nigerb Equatorial Guineab
1950–1955 6.50 6.76 6.40 6.86 5.50
1955–1960 6.58 6.76 5.99 7.05 5.50
1960–1965 6.65 6.76 4.93 7.29 5.53
1965–1970 6.70 6.18 3.46 7.53 5.66
1970–1975 6.55 5.00 2.62 7.74 5.68
1975–1980 6.37 4.34 1.87 8.00 5.68
1980–1985 5.97 3.68 1.69 8.05 5.79
1985–1990 5.11 3.24 1.71 7.94 5.89
1990–1995 4.32 3.00 1.76 7.79 5.89
1995–2000 3.70 2.75 1.57 7.61 5.87
2000–2005 3.18 2.55 1.36 7.38 5.64
2005–2010 2.90 2.45 1.27 7.15 5.36
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ted poverty, such as Botswana, Colombia, or Singapore, po-
pulation growth has decreased continuously since the 1950s, 
but it remains high in countries such as Equatorial Guinea and 
Niger where poverty continues (Table 2). Also, when we look 
at the ranking for countries by TFR, we see that most top co-
untries with high TFR are in Africa, the top ten being Niger, 
Mali, Somalia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Zambia, 
Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Angola. Approximately 100 
countries have TFRs below 2. 
The crucial variable for the ecological sustainability of our 
planet is the number of human beings who will share its limi-
ted resources over the coming millennium. Fertility is the 
main variable determining what the human population will 
be like in 2100. Depending on what policies our generation 
will initiate, the United Nations estimates that there will be 
between 6 billion and 16 billion people by the end of the cen-
tury (there are 7.2 billion today). Of course, for ecological re-
asons, it would be much better if, in 2100, the world’s popu-
lation was closer to 6 billion than to 16 billion.
The best way of achieving that is by overcoming poverty, 
and one way to do that is by changing the way in which we 
reward medical, agricultural and environmental innovation.
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Resum. Hem après que la velocitat i la qualitat de la innovació es poden augmentar molt mitjançant 
la concessió als innovadors de monopolis temporals, com ara patents o drets d’autor, que els permeten 
obtenir guanys mitjançant el cobrament de marges elevats. Però aquest tipus de monopolis temporals 
promouen la innovació a costa de la difusió. En altres paraules, com més innovem o incentivem la inno-
vació, més paguem en termes de la difusió d’aquestes mateixes innovacions. Premiar la innovació de 
manera equivocada en les àrees de la producció de medicaments, de la producció d’aliments i en la 
innovació ambiental té efectes especialment greus per als pobres. El sistema actual no és eficient en 
termes d’accés, selecció d’objectius i rendibilitat. El Fons per a l’Impacte sobre la Salut (Health Impact 
Fund) proposa una nova manera de pagar la innovació farmacèutica, incentivant el desenvolupament i 
subministrament de nous medicaments a través de mecanismes de pagament per resultats. A més, la 
mateixa idea es podria aplicar a la innovació agrícola i ambiental.
Paraules clau: Health Impact Fund · sanitat, indústria farmacèutica · innovació · patents · agricultura 
· ambient · creixement demogràfic 
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